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Abstract: «One» and «Many» have been many times studied bothfrom a theolo-
gícal andfrom an ontob^cal viewpoint. In the realm ofEastem Islamic Phibsophy 
and in the background ofits Neoplatonic basical directíves. Sadrá al-Shtrázi (ob. 
1640) develops an ontobgical analysis ofthis traditional topic which differsfrom the 
one formerly displayed by Muslim Peripatetics. By adopting and continuing Ibn al-
Arabt'sgnosis andal-Suhrawardt's Oriental wisdotn he discttssesAvicenna's distinc-
tion between a Necessary Being and a multiplicity ofpossibU beings, as well as 
Avicenna's tendency to consider existence as accidental. Based upon the coimplication 
ofthree main concepts: isálat al-wujúd (priority of being), wa dat al-wujúd (unity 
of being)andtas\úvik (intensivedifferentiatíon of being), Sadrá's monadolo^caluni-
vocism, and in general Post-Avicennan Iranian philosophy may help us to revaluate 
some philosophical issues which nowadays attemp to appear in a new light. 
Key-Words: Eastem Islamic Philosophy — Unity and Plurality of Being -
Monadobgy - Mulla Sadrá Shtrázi 
First achieved in the Eastern lands of Islam by such figures as Sadr al-Dín 
al-Qúnawí, Sa'íd ai-Din al-Farghání, Mu'ayyid al-Dín al-Jandi, 'Abd al-Razzáq 
al-Káshání, Sharaf al-Dín Dáwúd al-Qays.arí and Abd al-Karím al-Jílí, as well 
as by some outstanding shí'ite thinkers like ^aydar al-Amulí, Ibn Abí Jumhúr 
al-Ahsá'í and Sá'in al-Dín Turkah al-Isfahání, the legacy of Ibn al-Arabí's gno-
sis ('irfán)Wiú{in the Iranian culture is doubtless remarkable ^ Ñor less reliant 
' See for Qünawí, Farghání, Jandi, Kasháni and Jíli C.W. CHITTICK, «The School of 
Ibn 'Arabi», in 8.5. NASR & O. LEAMAN, (eds.), History of Islamic Philsophy, London, 1996, 
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is its rigorous philosophical reception, which must be considered mainly in the 
Ikht of the Ishráqi school founded by Shaykh al-Ishráq^ Shi ab al-Din Ya yá 
al Suhrawardi. What leads us to the extraordinary synthesis undertoojc by Sadr 
al-DÍn Mu ammad al-ShírázÍ, commonly known as Mulla Sadrá, in the 
XVIth-XVIIth Centuries \ 
As S H Nasr indicates, «Mulla Sadrá knew intimately the tradition ofPersian 
Sufipoetr^, in one ofwhose centers, Shiráz, he hadin fact been ratsed...mthtn the 
PerL Zltural Jrld it is the Mathnawi of Mau>l^nd JalM al-Dtn Rurnt that ts 
auoted most ojien by him... [But] despite the significance of Rumt andother mas-
ters, howevenit is the Sufism ofthe school oflbn Arabt that had left the mostpro-
found mark upan Sadr ai-Din, whose works contam hteralfy hundrecU ofreferences 
to theAndalusian masteroflslamicgnosis... [So much so that] Mullú Sadrá would 
be inconceivabU without Ibn 'Arabt, and one ofthe most important radii oftnfluen-
ce ofthe teachings of Shaykh al-Akbar' [as Ibn 'Arabi is known in Islam] mmt be 
somht in Mulla Sadrá andhis school... [Forsooth] few mtellectual masters of Islam 
knew Ibn Arabt as well as Mulla Sadrá and it is mostly through his writtngs that 
the influence oflbn Arabt reached later generations ofPersian sages andgnostics» \ 
Nevertheless, Mulla Sadrás thought shall not be considered merely eclec-
tic for this wouíd only bring a rash answer concerning its material geneaology, 
and thus an elliptical silence regarding what subsists beyond the confluence of 
the sources and disposes them within a common realm in agreement with a 
certain theoretical structure. Henee we may say that Sadr al-Muta Uihin ^ as 
Mulla Sadrá is known in Irán, recieves both the influence oflbn al-'Arabí and 
al-Suhrawardi (as well as the influence of their respective schools) by readjus-
ting and developing in his own way some of their specific theoretical and spi-
ritual contents. As someone sometime said, the power and the competence of 
vol I pp. 510-523; and for Ámulí, Jumhúr and Turkah I^faliáni H. CORBIN, En Islam ira-
nien. Aspects spirituels etphilosophiques, París, 1971-72, new ed. 1991, vol. III, «Les Fideles d'a-
mour. Shi'isme et soufisme». 
2 Literally: «the Master of lUumination». 
3 Which do correspond to the Xth-XIth Islamic Centuries. Sadrá al-Shirází was born 
around 1570-1572, and died in 1640. 
^ Literally: «the Greatest Master» (Doctor Maximus). 
5 S.c. NASR, Sadr ai-Din Shirázi and his Trascendent Theosophy - Background Life and 
Works, Tehran, 1978, new ed. 1997, p. 74. 
fi More or less literally: «the Prince of Theosophers». 
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a philosophical system consists not only in its inherent ability to créate new 
concepts and ideas, but also in die way it renews diose already given''. 
Let US recall again S.HNasr. «While gradually in the West thepossibility of 
the experience ofBeing nearly disappeared and the visión ofBeinggave way to 
the discussion ofthe concept ofbeing andfinally to the disintegration ofthis very 
concept in certain schools -he writes-, in the [Eastern] Islamic worldphilosophy 
drew even closer to the ocean ofBeing itselfuntilfinally it became the complement 
ofgnosis and its extensión in the direction ofsystematic exposition and analysis» *. 
This is, indeed, what we would like to examine here by confronting both the 
concept of wa dat al-wujúd developed in the Akbarian school and the concept 
of tashktk that complements and determines it in a higher degree according to 
Sadrá Shírází's ontology. We may transíate the former by the current formula: 
«unity ofbeing», and the last one by the two-dimensional notion of «intensi-
ve differentiation and gradation (ofbeing)», as we shall see. 
We will mainly remit, on the other hand, to Sadrá al-Shirází s Kitáb al-
mashá'ir, an ontological essay originally written in Arable by the Persian philo-
sopher. Most of Sadrás treatises are in fact written in Arable language, despite 
the large number of Persian wrltlngs that are to be found in Iranian philosophy 
from the Xlth Century onwards .̂ Some thirty six years ago, Henry Corbin, to 
whose memory we would like to dedícate this arricie, translated into French the 
Kitáb al-mash&'ir 2& the Book of MetaphysicalPenetrations'°, a title by which it 
has become already well known in many Western philosophical circles. It con-
sists of eight chapters or mashá'ir'm which Sadr al-Muta'Uihín summarizes some 
of the ontological theses previously set forth by him throughout the first safar 
of his opus magnum, the Kitáb al- ikntat al-muta'áliyyah ft'l-asfir al-'aqliyyat al-
arba'ah (briefly known as Asfir), discussing thoroughly the fundamental assum-
^ Cf.G. DELEUZE, Spinoza et le prohlhne de l'expression, Paris, 1968, newed. 1985, p. 299. 
* S.H. NASR, «Post-Avicennan Islamic Philosophy and the Study ofBeing», in P. MORE-
WEDGE, (ed.), Philosophies of Existence - Ancient and Medieval, New York, 1982, p. 337. 
' Cy S.HNASR, «The Significance of Persian Philosophical Works in the Tradición of Islamic 
Philosophy», in G. HOURANI, (ed.), Essays on Islamic Philosophy and Science, Albany, 1975, 
pp. 67-75. 
'" MULLA SADRÁ [AL-]SHIRAZI, Le Livre des penetrations mitaphysiques I Kitáb al-mash'tr I 
Ketáb-e mashá'er, edition ofthe original Arable text and of die Persian commented versión of 
Badí' al-Mulk Mírzá 'Imád al-Dawlah, introduction, French translation and notes by H. 
Corbin, Tehran/Paris, 1964, newed. 1982. 
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tions of Avicennan or mashshd'íontology, to whose distinction of wujúd{hemg) 
and máhiyyah (quiddity) he oposes isálat al-wujúd (priority of being), wa dat 
<i/-íi'«;á¿/(uniiy of being^^) and tashkik. 
It is true that Mulla Sadrá recieved, among other theoretical influences as 
those of Shi'ite and Sunnite theology (kalám), some of Ibn Síná's philosophi-
cal directives '^, both through the teachings of Mir Dámád, widí whom he stu-
died in Isfahán, and through the works of such Mashshá'i authors as Abü'l-
'Abbás al-Lúkari, Abú'l-Barakát al-Baghdádi, Nasir al-DÍn al-£úsí, Qutb al-
Dín al-Shírázi (who is also a relevant Ishráqi), Dabírán Katibí al-Qazwíní, 
Athír al-Dln al-Abharí, Sadr ai-Din and Ghiyáth ai-Din Mansúr al-Dashtakí, 
and of course Ibn Síná, all of which he knew in detall. But this would be the 
subject of a different study. Here we shall only present their ontological dis-
crepancies, for it is in account of his objections towards mashshá'i ontolo^ 
that Sadr al-Muta'Uihín reassesses and pursues Akbarian speculative mysticism 
(named in Persian 'irfin-i nazari) and Ishráqi illuminative wisdom. 
To begin with, and in order to make clear the difference between the two 
concepts mentioned above, we must say that whereas wa dat al-nmjúd'máicí-
tes both the reality and the divinity of being (which is percieved by shuhúdal-
u°úrtox presential knowledge), tashktk íotes^oAovfs its efFective expression, in 
which ontological diversity plays a main role. Thereof we may speak, when 
refering to the science of being achieved throughout Sadrás ontological mas-
ter-pieces (a science that is called in Persian hastíshinást), about a «monadolo-
gical» prosecution of the ontology developed in the Akbarian gnostic school, 
both in the light of Ibn al-Arabí s theory of the Divine Ñames and in the light 
of Ishráqi wisdom. This shows up to be evident not only with regard to Mulla 
Sadrás own thought, but also with regard to its profound theoretical and spi-
ritual legacy, that is to be observed in the works of his disciples along the past 
three hundred and fifty years '^. Yet we may also find tashkik, at least to a cer-
tain extent, in Sadrá's Persian sources. 
'• Which may be designed as well as taw id al-umjüd. 
'^ Ibn Siná is Avicenna's ñame transliterated according to its Arabic pronunciation. 
'3 See for instance H. CORBIN & S.J. ÁSHTYÁNl, Anthologie desphilosophes iraniens depuis 
leXVIIe siicUjusqu'á nosjours, Tehran/Paris, 1972-76, 2 vols. 
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If we open for instaxice 9ayclar al-Ámulis glosses upon Ibn al-'Arabís Fusú_ 
al- ikam, §§ 842-843, we will read that the 'árif{úie. gnostic) must both, 
according to him, «intégrate and difierentiate». «Thou shallst unify bothpers-
pectíves -he writes-, for only he who links them may be called a muwa id aqiqí», 
that is, someone that afirms and practises taivhid, unity, in a truthful way. «To 
link them both _he goes on_ is the same as to reach jam' al-jam' [the «integra-
tion of integration«]. Know that to differentiate (tafriqah) means to contémplate 
the creatures [and thus multipHcity] without contemplating at the same time the 
Divine Being [the Unique]. And that to [merely] intégrate means to contempla-
te Divine Being without contemplating at the same time the creatures. He who 
limits himselfto this last option will never reach the visión of Divine Being within 
Its epiphanic forms, throughout which It manifests Itself though in another sense 
they differfrom It... Henee one must have at the same time both the visión ofthe 
Divine Being linked to the visión ofthe creatures and the visión ofthese linked to 
the visión ofthe formen In other words, one must be able to see multipHcity in its 
unity. This total visión is called'yam al-jam'» '̂̂ . ^aydar al-Amulí lived in the 
XlVth Century. Some three hundred years later a pupil of Mulla Sadrá, 
Hussayn al-Tunkábuní, asserts that «Unity of being goes hand by hand with the 
multipHcity ofits theophanies (tajalliyát), and thus limited existences are not to be 
considered illusory or without consistence, as certain sufispretend» ^'. Finally, one 
of Mulla Sadrás contemporary Persian interpreters, S.J. Áshtyání, writes: «Itis 
according to its own limit (bisájat) and mesure (andázih) how each thing com-
prehends thefirst Truth ( aqq-i ta'áli) » '^. 
Let US now briefly refer to Shaykh al-Ishráq Shi áb al-Dín Ya yá al-
Suhrawardí, by whose writings and teachings Sadr al-Muta'llihín was ñor less 
deeply influenced, inasmuch we may say that he is a true Ishráqí philosopher 
despite the fact that he submits Ishráqí wisdom to an outstanding revisión by 
means of introducing the ontological principie concerning isálat al-wujúd (pño-
rity of existence) there where the young Shaykh al-Ishráq (who was murdered at 
the age of thirty six by some Sunnite jurists) sustains the priority of essences over 
'"' S.H AL-AMULI, Noff al-Nu{úi, edited with an introduction by H. Corbin, Tehran/Paris, 
1975. We foUow here Corbin's translation of diis passage, offered by him ¡n Le partuioxe du 
monothéisme, Paris, 1981, pp. 34-35. 
" Refered by Corbin in Philosophie iranienne etphilosophie comparée, Tehran, 1977, new 
ed. (Paris) 1985, p. 72. 
'̂  S.J. ASHTYANI, Hastí az nazar-i falsafih wa 'irfhn, Mashhad, 1380 I.H., new ed. 1376 
S.H., p. 36; our own translation (OT, onwards). 
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being. Both Ibn al-'Arabi and al-Suhrawardi had been meanwhile, as well as Ibn 
Siná though in a complete diíFerent way, die most determinant figures upon 
Iranian philosophy fi-om die Xlldi to die XVIdí Centuries. Shaykh al-Shahid 
Shi áb al-Dín reinterpretates Platos Ideas bodi in an active way, refusing to con-
sider them as mere concepts, and by adding a «latitudinal» order of Immaterial 
Lights to Ibn Sína s «longitudinal» one, an issue on which he tecalis Zoroastrian 
noetical angelology, revaluating henee intelligible multiplicity ^\ According to 
al-Suhrawardi's ikmat al-ñhráq, each thing tends towards and expresses its own 
Intelligible Light, which is to be considered as a specific grade of Divine Light '8. 
Once £ ^ n we are forced to carefully observe, dierefore, what in Arable is called 
al-kathmh fi'l-wa dah wa'l-wa dah fi'l-kathrah, «multiplicity in unity and unity 
in multiplicity» '^. And we are forced to observe the terms of such a relationship 
as non-external to the relationship itself, that is, in a rigorous «synchronic» 
mode. In other words, none of them has an existential priority over the odier, 
althought unity is axiologically prior to multiplicity, for every multiplicity parti-
cipates of, tends towards and expresses in some way unity. 
Of course we may say that the One is the trascendent efficient cause of 
multiplicity by adopting either a creationist or an emanationist derivative 
approach which would present its unity and reality as being radically (in the 
first case) or at least partially (in the second one) separated '^^, but we would 
then remain in the view that according to the school of Ibn al-Arabi caracte-
rizes merely -as Corbin points out with vigour^^- taw idal-ulüht, that is, «the-
ological» or exoteric taw id, which places God above all comparison. Although 
necessary, this procedure may nevertheless become, if applied in an unilateral 
way, the premise of what Ibn Arabí himself calis «spiritual indisposition», and 
even the rudiment of a more or less explicit «dualism». Thus we may by con-
trast assert^^ that the One is underneath multiplicity, in the sense of Greek 
'^ See on Zoroastrian angelology and its influence on Persian Islamic thought H. 
CORBIN's Corps spirituele et Terre celeste. De l'Iran mazdéen á l'Iran shi'ite, París, 1979. 
'8 See for al-Suhrawardí's metaphysics H. CORBIN, En Islam iranien, vol. 2, «Sohrawardi 
et les Platoniciens de Perse», as well as S.H. NASR, The Islamic IntelUctual Traditton in Persia, 
Richmond, 1996, pp. 125-153. 
" See for the application of this crucial principie in the realm of Muslim art T. 
BURCKHARDT, The Art of Islam, London, 1976, chapter IV, § 3. 
2" As Muslim theologians and Muslim peripatetic philosophers do. 
^' Cf. among other texts Le paradoxe du monothéisme, pp. 11-49. 
^̂  As many Sufis have done. 
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hypokeimenon or Latin substratum, by adopting a reductive approach which 
would identify its unity as a «substantial» (and therefore as a material) unity, 
but here again we may ask if by doing such we would not deny al-kathrah fi'l-
wa dah wa'l-wa dahfí'l-kathrah, at least in the above mentioned «synchronic» 
form, which, by contrast, does not consider ontological difFerences to be 
merely accidental. And so we may at last suggest, recognizing both its «imma-
nence» and its «trascendence», that the One multiplies itself without dividing 
itself throughout multiplicity by adopting a «monadological» or «pluri-seriea-
lized» approach that would positively preserve both terms of the structure as 
being complementary ^̂ . The same task goes for being, being it unique. 
Certainly the three hypotheses, of which the two initial ones are the most 
extended in both Islamic and non-Islamic thought, difFer. And it must be said 
that Mulla Sadrá al-Shírází adopts the third one, which as the second one has to 
do with taw idal-wujúdi ot «ontological» taw /Vrather than with taw idal-ulühí. 
Inasfar as tashktk is for him the necessary complement of wa dat al-umjúd. 
And now we may finally draw our attention towards Sadrás Kit&b al-
mashá'ir. We will only examine here an excerpt of its four initial chapters, 
which correspond to §§ 5-68. And we will do so by dividing some of its con-
tents into three short Sections throughout which we will intend to show out 
how Sadr al-Muta'Uihín discusses Avicennan metaphysics and settles the con-
text in which the three ontological principies formerly refered {isálat al-wujúd, 
toa dat al-wujúd and tashktk), to which he does not however explicitly refer as 
such, become intelligible. We have named these Sections as follows: 
— On being's reality, knowledge and self-determination (Section I, §§ 5, 
6, 10, 16&30) . 
— On how being is not, with regard to its eífective reality, accidental, ñor 
it merely updates logical possibility (Section II, §§ 10, 13, & 19) 
23 «Monadology» may be defined as «a metaphysical system that interprets the world as a 
harmonious unity encompassing aplurality ofsuch self-determining simple entities» (L.E. LoEMKER, 
«Monad and Monadology», in P. EDWARDS, (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, New York, 
1967, vol. V, p. 362) which are to be considered as different expressive modes of the One {cf. 
LEIBNIZ'S Discours de métaphysique, § 9). 
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— And, finally, on beings unity and multiplicity as well as on the reciprocity 
between being and essence (Section III, §§ 12, 14, 24, 51-52, 53 & 55). 
Notice diat Seaion I deals mainly widí beings self-evidence and simplicity, its 
active immanence widiin the reaim of plurality and its unity. Seaion II deals basi-
cally, meanwhile, with beings priority over the quiddities, and, inasíar as these are 
not to be taken as accidental secondary charaaers with regard to being itself, 
whith beings internal difFerentiation. Section III deals altogether with the three 
above mentioned notions: isálat al-umjúd, wa dat al-ivujúd and tashkik the last 
one may be as well deduced from the unión of being and essence thus quoted. 
Section I. On being's reality, knowledge and self-determination 
«The reality (anniyya) of being-vfmes Mulla Sadrá- is the most evident (ajiá) of 
all things with regard to its presence (hudíxr) and discovery (kashf)» (§ 5), «none of 
which may be understood but through presential knowledge» (§ 30). Here we find 
an essential topic of Ishráqí wisdom '̂̂ . On the other hand, he says too, «being 
consists in the [eíFective] determination (ta'ayy*") and individuation (tashakhk-
has*") [of ail there is]..., being self individuation and self-determination by means 
ofits essence (dhat)» (§ 5). Thus its reality cannot be expounded by description, 
for there is no other thing as manifest or notorious as being itself is and by which 
it could be then described (c^ § 6). At last, he notices, «being is [to be conside-
red] simple (basií)» (§ 10) or indivisible, and henee one and unique. 
«The reality ofa certain thing-h.e explains further on- consists in nothing but 
its specific act of being, from within which itfollow its effects (áthárah) and vir-
tues (a kamah)... Being is therefore the reality ( aqíqah) ofall those things that do 
possess reality, not needing ofany other reality» (§ 16). 
Let US tecali that Ibn Síná had distinguished wujúd and máhiyyah (being 
and quiddity), and that he had regarded the former as being almost acciden-
tal, or in other words as a so to say idle atribute '^^. Yet such a dangerous deva-
^^ Al-Suhrawardí's distinction between a presential knowledge ('ilm al-hudúrí, which may 
also be called kashf, shuhúd al-hudúrí sná 'ilm al-ishráqt) and a merely representative knowled-
ge ('ilm al-súrí). 
^' Ibn Síná considers being to be a non-necessary concomitant (lawá iq) of the quiddity, 
although not explicidy an accident ('arad). A subtil but somehow insatisfactory remark, at least 
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luation of being into what simply updates a certain logical possibility (what 
something may be according to its quiddity) obscures the reliant conection 
diat is to be found between being's activity and its determination in concreto, 
what leads us to the next Section. 
Section II. On how being is not, with regará to its effective reality, 
accidental, ñor it merely updates logical possibility 
«Being tvhich is said to be accidental ('aradi) with regard to the existent bein^ 
-writes Sadr al-Muta'llihín- is an abstraction (intizá') attained by the mind, and 
thus not real being» (§ 10), which being as we have seen the principie of every 
concrete determination cannot be therefore accidental. 
«How can it be one (itta adah) with the quiddities, and how can they be true 
with regard to it [if we consider them both] extemally (fi'1-khárij) -he adds-, 
whereasfor the mind(ñ'l-dhihn) thatabstracts(tz\\\) itsconcept{malD^VLm) being 
is [on the contrary percieved as] accidentad» (§ 13). Henee we may infer that 
«upon that which only in addition accompanies the quiddities as something added 
to them (indimán) or as a way of considering them (i'tibár) [in the Mashshá'í 
perspective] depends by contrast their reality» (§ 19), and thus speak of the prio-
rity of being over the quiddities. 
Ibn Síná had introduced the difference between wujúd and máhiyyah in 
order to explain the gap that he believed to be existent between the Necessary 
(wájib) Being: God, and the possible (munkin) beings: the creatures. Within 
the former they both coincide, whereas within the possible beings they diflFer. 
Mulla Sadrá does not accept the «delay» thus settled between the two. And this 
may show us why isdlat al-tvujúd and wa dat al-wujúd are deeply connected 
for him. 
if he was not only thinking logically but also in an ontological manner (as the ulterior Mashshá'í 
tradition does in Sadrás view), which on the other hand is as an issue quite difficult to precise. 
Cf. M. CRUZ HERNÁNDEZ, «La distinción aviceniana de la esencia y de la existencia y su inter-
pretación por la filosofía occidental», in AA.W., Homenaje a Millas Vallicrosa, Barcelona, 1954, 
vol. I, pp. 331-347, where Avicennas distinaion is also regarded from the Western historical 
viewpoint; and, on Avicennan metaphysics in general, R. RAMÓN GUERRERO'S very complete 
essay «Sobre el objeto de la metafísica según Avicena», in Cuadernos de Pensamiento de la 
Fundación Universitaria Española, no. 10, pp. 59-75. 
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But what would happen if we were now to regard, once stablished diat 
ivujúd is not accidental, that essences deserve an analogous accidental treat-
ment? Briefly, we would remain in the view of wa dat al-wujúd, and we would 
be right enough to comprehend in such a way the reality of being, which is 
undoubtedly unique, but we would nevertheless ignore its efFective expression 
in concreto within multiplicity. Sadrá rebufFs this too much indifFerentiated 
«monistic» view by setting forth the principie of tashktk. 
Being is not an accident, ñor the essences mere concepts or logical quiddi-
ties. As we have already indicated, «univocity» explains the reality of being, 
whereas its intensive diíferentiation explains its efFective (or in other words its 
active and intensive) expression ^̂ . There is an intensive «gradation» of being 
(as there is an intensive gradation of light) inasmuch as being's activity is some-
times reached and expressed either in a higher degree or, by contrast, in a lower 
one. And there is an intensive «diíferentiation» of being (as there is an inten-
sive diíferentiation of light) inasmuch as here and there being is not equally 
unified, reached and expressed. Tashktk (literally «oscillation», dubitatio) and 
thus «monadology» have to do with such complex meaning, both «longitudi-
nal» and «latitudinal», so to say. «According to Sadrá -writes henee Áshtyání-, 
being is the one and only truth [of existence], but it presents numerous divisions 
and grades (marátib-i moti adidi-yi motikathir) in the light o/tashkik» ^7. 
«Tashkik is interpreted in the school of Mulla Sadrá to mean that a single 
universal is predicable in different degrees and grades of its particulars —^writes 
S.H. Nasr—... Ifweponder the concept oft2s\Mk we willdiscover, however, that 
there is not one but two kinds of gradation: thefirst one is one in which what cau-
ses the difference... in various degrees of something partaking of gradation is the 
same as that which these degrees or grades share in common..., for example num-
bers or light. Both the number two and three are grades ofthe universal' number. 
Moreover, what they have in common is numerality and what separates them is 
also numerality. The same holds true for light. This type of gradation is called 
tashkík khássí or particular gradation. The second is one in which what various 
^^ Being is to be regarded as intensive for the very simply reason that it is here approached 
despite any extensional or quantitative paradigm, which means that it is comprehended as being 
active and thus puré activity according to its essence. Light's intensive reflection model may help 
US once again to clarify this and other similar questions. 
27 S.J. ÁSHTYANI, op. cit., p. 26 (OT). 
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grades share in common is not what separates them from each other, such as the 
existence ofAbraham and Mases. What these two prophets share in common is 
existence but what separates them is their separation in time as well as other fac-
tors. This second type o/'tashkík is called tashkík 'ámmí or general gradation. 
When this analysis is applied to existence -he adds-, it becomes olear that the 
notion of existence partakes of general gradation whereas the reality of existence 
partakes of particular gradation. When we think of the existence ofA and the 
existence ofB in our mind, the notion ofthe existence ofA and the notion ofthe 
existence ofB share the notion of existence in common, but they are separated by 
other factors. Yet the reality of existence is a single reality partaking of grades -he 
concludes-, so that what distinguishes the existence ofA from the existence ofB 
is the reality of existence and what unites them is also the reality of existence. This 
is the basis of the doctrine ofthe 'trascendent unity of being... which crowns 
Mulla. Sadrá's metaphysics» *̂. 
Sectíon III . On being's unity and multiplicity as well as on the reci-
procity between being and essence 
«The reality of being-wiites Sadr al-Muta'Uihín- does not include all things 
in the way the universal concept (ma'ní al-kuUí) comprises particular cases» 
(§ 12). In other terms: «The reality of being involves differentiated realities 
(mukhtalafat al- aqá'iq) by means ofthe differentiation of quiddities, each one 
being one (mutta idah) and linked to a certain grade (martabah) and to a certain 
plan (darajah) of being» (§ 14). 
«Unless the quiddity is initially considered to be reciprocal to the act of being 
(mutta idat bi-1-wujúd), as we sustain; unless it is considered to be non-acciden-
tal [i.e. the subject to which being is added as such], as Mashshá'tphibsophers 
defend; or unless it is added to being itselfi as certain Sufisproclaim -argües Sadrá-
, it is notpossible for it to be existent» (§ 24). But «if being [simply] qualifies the 
quiddity, this one wouldbe [regarded as] its receptacle. Andinasmuch as the recep-
tacle must exist before its fulfilment, we would be then forced to admitt that the 
quiddity exists before being [which is certainly absurd]. Although being cannot 
occur without a quiddity this does not albw us to see in the quiddity a receptacle. 
•̂ ' S.H NASR, Sadr ai-Din Shirázi and his Trascendent Theosophy, pp. 107-108. 
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since their reciprocity expresses an unión (itti ádiyyah) and not a copulation 
(irtibáíiyyah)» between the two (§§ 51-52). 
«Being must be either placed befare the quiddity or after it -he explains ílirt-
her on-; altematively, they may be considered to be at the same time [as said and 
discussed above]. Thefirst hypothesis takes for granted that being is independent 
from the quiddity. The second one presumes that the quiddity is before properly 
being The third one settUs, finally that they are both at the very same time, but 
being the quiddity not by means of being itself, what finally leads us towards the 
second hypothesis. Being such consequences clearly false, the premise must also be 
so... To consider that being is accidental has only some sense ifthe quiddity is abs-
tractedfrom within the act of being that corresponds to it. An this is the same as 
to say that being is extrinsic (khárij) with regard to the quiddity... Whereas their 
effective reciprocity is intended to mean, on the one hand, that being is essentially 
not separated from its specific determination, and, on the other hand, that the 
quiddity is linked to it and that it is on account ofit» (§§ 53, 55). 
One and Many are dius for Sadrá two difFerent ñames diat ñame a single 
thing according to the process by which it becomes manifest. Hereby and as 
Corbin quotes, «determination shows up to be [for him] the law of being» '^^. The 
same goes for Ibn al-'Arabi if we examine the role that Divine Ñames play in his 
gnosis: «They all remit to an unique Named-precises Corbin-, but each one refers 
to an essentialdetermination, thus differentfrom otherpossibU ones... To merely stop 
in front ofthe unity ofthe One [differendy] Named would mean to stop infront of 
the Divine Being as a 5í^(dhát) independently from the world and from the rela-
tions that are to befound between its Ñames and the Ñames ofthe world,-. forget-
ting therefore that the Divine Being is only revealed to us throughout... [its specific] 
configurations... And this would mean not topercieve unity in multiplicity» '°. And 
the same goes too for ai-Suhrawardí's Light ontological complicatio. 
29 H. CORBIN, notes on Sadrás ta'altqát upon al-SuHRAWARDls Kitáb ikmat al-ishráq, 
translated by H. Corbin altogether with Sadrás and Qutb ai-Din ai-Shiráz!'s glosses and edited 
by Ch. Jambet, Lagrase, 1986, p. 447, note a (OT). 
3" H. CORBIN, L'imagination créatrice dans le soufisme d'Ibn 'Arabi, Paris, 1958, new ed. 
1977, Part II, chapter 1, § 2, pp. 224-225 ofthe Spanish versión by A. López Tobajas and M. 
Tabuyo, Barcelona, 1993 (OT). 
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Now and to end with, let xis su^est that Sadrá s monadological univocism 
continúes a certain Ancient Neoplatonic tradition, as well as Akbarian and 
Ishráqí theories do. But Neoplatonic does not necessarily mean Plotinian. 
Indeed, Sadr al-Muta'llihín's «henology» is much closer to Proclus' thought 
than to Plotinus' one^^ A brief expianation will be perhaps useful. 
As the French specialist in Neoplatonic thought J. Trouillard expounds, 
«whereasfor Pbtinm reality is divided in hierarchical orders, goingfrom the One 
down to matter, in Proclus' works a different tendency is outlined as far as it com-
petís US to consider all orders, even the inferior ones, as radii immediately bomfrom 
within the universal centén Thus they all become, although not equally, direct 
modes ofthe One. In other words, whereasfor Plotinus their división is either tras-
cendent or descendent, for Proclus it is compensated by a circular distribution. No 
other shows up to be the meaning ofhis serial theory, which introduces each being 
or character in a chain whose principie is [each time] a self-determination of 
Unity. Beingfiill expression ofthe One», which communicates its oneness and 
its simphcity each time in a different way, «and thus capable ofself-determining 
itself... on account ofits own law, thisprincipie is called by Proclus afier Syrianus 
henad (henás). According to this specific viewpoint everything is submerged in the 
One and comes out ofit in its own andproper mode,... since the One does not esta-
blish but [difFerent] 'henads' (or henádesj, that is, simple [or indivisible] unities 
that place those serial characters which constitute the infinite variety of things. 
Hereof Proclus 'henads' must be said to be -says Trouillard- not productions but 
'manifestations' (hekphánseis) ofthe One» ^^. 
1 X l(a) X l(b) X l(c)... X 1(«) may be settled as a possible formula to 
express it ^̂ . Notice however that we are not only saying, for this would mean 
to still say very little indeed, that the center ofthe circomference is to be found 
in each concrete point ofits peryphery (or that «Deus est sphaera infinita cuius 
^' Yet his ontology is somehow Porphyrian _we foUow here P. HADOT'S remarks in «Dieu 
comme acte d'étre dans le néoplatonisme» (an article to be find in Dieu etl'Étre, París, 1978,pp. 
57-ss.), for the One is for him nothing but Being itself ( « Í Í , not ens). 
^^ J. TROUILLARD, «Le néoplatonisme», § «Proclus», in B. PARAIN, (ed.), Encyclopédie de 
la PUiade. Histoire de la philosophie, París, 1969, vol. 1, pp. 126-127, 134 ofthe Spanish ver-
sión, México, Siglo XXI, 1972 (OT). See also, from the same author, «La monadologie de 
Proclus», in Revuephilosophique de Louvain, 1959. 
^̂  See H. CORBIN'S Le paradoxe du monothéisme, loe. cit., where he writes 1 x 1 x 1 , etc., 
in order to difFerentiate the non-arithmetic multiplication of the «One», that by multiplying 
itself does not become divided, from the multiplicity ofthe «many» (1 + 1 + 1, etc.) 
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centrum est ubique, circumferentia nusquam», as the second proposition of the 
Liber viginti quattuor phibsphorum stablishes) ^, but that from within each 
point a new circumference may be drawn, and this ad infinitum (since «Deus 
est sphaera cuius tot sunt circumferentiae quot puncta») ̂ ^. 
We have indicated above that the One communicates its oneness and its 
simpUcity each time in a different way. But of course it does not communica-
te its Uniqueness, and this is the reason for which we must distinguish, as Ibn 
al-'Arabí does, between Divine a adiyyah and Divine wá idiyya, or, in other 
words, between Divine «Uniqueness» and Divine «Oneness», inverting there-
fore -as P. Beneito, the relevant Spanish specialist in Ibn al-'Arabi has both 
lucidly seen and explained- the usual transiation of both terms^^. With regard 
to the former one we may only say, as Mulla Sadrá notices in his Kitáb al-
w/ü/'á/> reminding us of a Qu'ránic verse, that «faces bow themselves infront of 
theEtemally Living, the Subsistent iai-<}3.yy, al-Qayyúm)» {Qu'rán, 20:111). For 
«negative» theology (tanzih) begins there and only there where «positive» the-
ology (tashbth) necessarily ends; and both are, as well as in another sense «one» 
and «many», the two different aspeas of a single truth and a of single reality. 
Thus we may say that Sadrá distinguishes four different but deeply related 
orders: a main asimetrical difference in beings unity, its univocity (which is not 
in contradiction with the former), the multiplicity ofits different expressions (i.e. 
a second realm of difference within its unity) and the difference ofeach diffe-
rence. Or in other words, that he considers «asimetry», «univocity» and «ana-
logy» (that we often think separately by thinking that asimetry means equivo-
city and by opposing the concepts of univocity and analogy) as its three defi-
nitory characters '̂'. Yet the question of Divine a adiyya held by the first cate-
'•* Haydar al-Ámulí gives a few examples of this model in his Nas( al-nusús, where he stu-
dies the reflection of the One upon the mirror of the many. 
35 Cf A. BAUSANI s «Note su alcuni aspetti 'scientifici' delie Futú dt di Ibn 'Arabi», in 
Revista degli Stndi Oriéntale, 1978, no. 52, pp. 199-215. See on the Liber?. Lucentini's edition 
and transiation (Milano, 1999) and his remarks on Eckhart's hermeneutics of both sentences. 
^ Cyr IBN AL-'ARABI'S Kitáb kashfal-ma 'n¿ 'an sirr asma 'Alláh al- usná, edited and trans-
lated by P. Beneito, Murcia, 1996, p. 354. 
''' Let E be existence, U Unity as beings supreme principie, D Difference as a second 
ontological principie, u any concrete unity thus reached by any particular being and dany con-
crete difference thus simultaniously expressed. From within the general principie E(x) = Ax 
(xGU A x£D), which may be considered as a variant of the piatonic principie E(x) = Ax (xGU 
A xGÜ) (cf. H. KRAMER, Platone e ifondamenti deüa metafísica. Milano, 1982, III, 1, D, where 
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gory was not thoroughly explored, in the realm of Post-Avicennan Iranian phi-
losophy, by Sadr al-Muta'Uihín's muta'dlíphilosophy (although he spoke of it 
too ^*), but by the school of another extraordinary relevant figure: Rajab 'Alí 
al-Tabrízí, who died between 1669-1670, the very same years in which 
Spinoza published his Tractatm theologtco-politicus and in which appeared 
Pascáis postuma Pernees sur la religión et sur quelques autres sujets. 
Ü rcpresents Multiplicity as a principie and £ each being's = x méthexis both in Unity and 
Multiplicity), four principies can be hereof setded according to Sadrás view: 1) Au (uGU A 
u#U), i.e. U>u; 2) Ad = d(U); 3) Au = d(U); and 4) Ax [x = d(D(U))]. Of course we are not 
herc infront of Platos thesis concerning the coimplicatiomn of the One (hén) and of the 
Indefinite Dualitude (aoristos duás) as two original principies, for Neoplatonic thought develops 
Hermodorus' view, that tends to place the One as the single principie of reality. But we are do-
ser to it than in any other form of Neoplatonism. 
*̂ Cf. the three distinctions that he observes within «absolute being» (tuujúd al-mutlaq): lá 
bi-shart (without condition), bi-sharti-lá (with negative condición) and munbasit (disclosed). 
Let US simply recall it. 
